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Summary
From the perspective of antitrust authorities, the multiplication of patents embodied in
technology standards is a source of concerns. Certainly it is necessary and efficient that
patents owners derive a revenue from the use of the standard. Yet by their function –
ensuring compatibility between different products by promoting a common technology
platform in a particular industry – standards generate potential for market power far
beyond the legal protection conferred by patents. Patent holders may thus be tempted
to leverage their position to make illegal profits. Such concerns arise in two different
cases that have fuelled antitrust debates and economic research during the last decade.
On the one hand, patent owners may be tempted to collude by coordinating their
licensing policies. The difficulty here is that some coordination between them within a
patent pool may actually be pro-competitive. After a brief introduction, we explain in
the first part why, and on what conditions, patent pools should be accepted by antitrust
authorities. On the other hand, patent owners may be tempted to manipulate the
standard setting process by waiting for the wide adoption of the standard before
charging excessive royalties to its users. We present this hold-up problem in the second
part, and show how appropriate rules for standard setting processes can help mitigate it.
Key words:
Introduction
The number of patents worldwide has increased enormously in the past 20 years
(Lévêque and Ménière, 2003). A similar inflation has taken place in technology
standards, in which patents have become an inevitable component (Figure 1). The
MPEG-2 video and audio compression standard, for example, incorporates 425 patents
with 28 different owners. Similarly, the WCDMA mobile telephony standard is based
on more than 6,000 patent applications owned by more than 30 firms. Besides the
patent surge observed in Information and Communication technology, the growing
number of patents reading on standards has various causes (Simcoe, 2005). Having one’s
patents incorporated in a standard has been increasingly perceived as an attractive
source of revenue. Therefore manufacturers participating in standard setting have
strengthened their propensity to disclose and claim standard-related patents, while new
firms specialized in R&D have started pushing their own proprietary technology in
standard setting organizations.
Figure 1: Total IPR disclosures in: ANSI, ATIS, ETSI, IEEE, IETF, ITU, OMA, TIA
(source: Simcoe, 2005).
I – Patent pools
Patent pools aim at granting a single license for a package of patents belonging to
different owners. Since the late 1990’s, they have been used for licensing technology
standards such as the Digital Versatil Disc, the MPEG video compression format or the
3G telecommunications norms. Such pools have been accepted by antitrust authorities
although they clearly raise collusion concerns. Indeed, they can facilitate the diffusion of
the standard to the benefit of both users and patent owners. We show in this part why
it is so and how the risk of collusive patent pools can be prevented. We also highlight
problems related to the formation of patent pools, that explain why they are
systematically used to license standards.
I.1 – PROCOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PATENT POOLS
A large number of patents reading on a standard raises various issues when it comes to
licensing those patents to producers of standard-compliant goods. Problems arise
because many patents are owned by many patent owners, each of which is entitled to
charge royalties to users of the standard. Decentralized licensing generates various
inefficiencies that harm both licensors and licensees. By contrast, pooling patents and
licensing them jointly can be welfare enhancing.
The first consequence of separate licensing is high transaction costs. Producers of
standard-compliant goods must identify and assess the patents they need to license,
contact all the relevant patent owners, and negotiate a separate license with each of
them. The more numerous the patent owners are, the longer the timeframes, the broader
the search and the higher the bargaining costs. Patent owners in turn incur parallel costs
of monitoring and enforcing licensing contracts signed with the same licensees. From this
perspective, organizing the joint licensing of all the patents is an intuitive move that
mitigates these transaction costs. The patent pool dedicated to the MPEG-2 video
compression standard is a good illustration of the efficiencies achieved by joint licensing.
Owners of patents reading on MPEG-2 delegate to a jointly owned enterprise, MPEG
LA, the task of licensing their patents as a single package. The pool was created in 1997
by 8 organizations holding some 100 patents representing 60% of the patents reading on
the MPEG-2 standard. The pool has since expanded rapidly. In 2004 it was comprised
of 650 patents owned by 25 organizations, accounting for more than 90% of the patents
surrounding the standard. The MPEG-2 patent pool offers “one-stop shopping” to
users of the standard. It thereby saves search and negotiation costs for would-be
licensees. Notably, it also achieves economies of scale by handling the certification of
patents, instead of leaving each patent holder to demonstrate that its own patents are
valid and do read on the standard. These savings benefit both patent owners and
standard users. Furthermore, by reducing the cost of licensing a standard, they facilitate
its widespread adoption.
Besides mitigating transaction costs, the main rationale for creating patent pools is what
economists refer to as multiple marginalization. This term originally designated the
stacking of monopoly margins in vertical activity chains. Using the example of copper
and zinc production monopolized by two firms, French economist Augustin Cournot
(1838) demonstrated that the price of their alloy, brass, was higher than the price that
would have been set by a single monopoly integrating the production of both metals.
Whence the paradoxical result (often cited in merger control) that the merger of two
vertical monopolies benefits consumers (as does, by extension, the non-horizontal
merger of two firms with market power). It also benefits the firms because the joint
profit from the new entity is higher than the sum of the profit of the two separate firms.
This is possible because the products are complementary: by raising its margin on zinc,
the non-integrated firm does not take into account the reduction in the quantity of
copper sold by the other monopoly, and vice versa. This negative externality disappears
when the firms merge. Applied to the standards covered by multiple complementary
patents, the Cournot effect implies that the royalties claimed by each owner and the
total amount of royalties will be too high compared with the economic optimum. As a
consequence, the costs of using the standard are excessively high for licensees, thereby
limiting diffusion of the technology. At the same time, patent owners earn less royalty
revenue than they could have if they had coordinated their licensing policies.
Unlike with vertical chains, concentration between all patent owners may not be a
realistic solution in the case of patents reading on technology standards. For instance, it
is pure fantasy to envision a merger between Canon, France Telecom, Samsung, Fujitsu,
General Electric, Bosch, Sony and the University of Columbia as a solution to the
multiple marginalization problem in the case of the MPEG-2 standard. Creating a patent
pool is a more realistic option, and with similar effects. Granting a package license with
a single royalty for all patents prevents multiple marginalization. The royalty revenue
can then be divided between patent owners on a previously agreed basis. As shown
above, patent owners have a mutual interest in settling on a solution like this. However,
as demonstrated below, there are various obstacles to the formation of patent pools,
including clearance by the antitrust authority and agreeing on the royalty charged for the
package (see inset below) and on the breakdown of revenue collected by the pool.
Royalty negotiation between integrated manufacturers and pure patent holders
The first standards in the information and telecommunications industries were
developed by incumbent telephone monopolists and large hardware and software
vendors. These companies were integrated, i.e., they both manufactured and sold the
new technologies they had developed. They could cooperate easily on standard setting
because they were a small number of similar companies. They competed only on
downstream product markets. However, the standard setting environment has been
changing (Simcoe, 2005). Alongside integrated manufacturers, small technology firms
have become involved in the standard setting process. Unlike integrated manufacturers,
these small firms are not involved in downstream markets. They derive all their profits
from the sale of their inventions via licensing or buyouts. Generating revenue from their
IPRs by having them incorporated into technology standards and licensed is therefore a
key success factor in their business models.
The entry of pure patent holders has complicated the setting of cumulative royalties
within patent pools. Integrated manufacturers and pure patent holders have vested
interests in the matter that depend on their different organizations and business models.
Pure patent owners derive their revenue solely from licensing. Hence their interest is to
leverage the market power of the pool in order to set a high royalty. The interests of
integrated manufacturers are different because of their presence on downstream product
markets. On the one hand, they are licensors who derive more revenue from a high
royalty. On the other hand, they are licensees who must pay royalties (e.g., the share of
the package royalty that is distributed to the other patent owners) for their
manufacturing activity. Because of this second effect, integrated patent owners are more
reluctant to charge high cumulative royalties for the package of patents. Instead, they
tend to push for lower royalties in patent pool negotiations (Kim, 2004). From a static
standpoint, when the influence of integrated manufacturers in patent pools is strong,
this tends to lower the total royalty and consequently the prices charged to consumers.
Conversely, the stronger the influence of pure patent holders, the higher the royalty
charged for the patent package, and the higher the prices charged to consumers.
I.2 – ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF PATENT POOLS
Besides their procompetitive effects, patent pools create various opportunities for their
members to coordinate for anticompetitive purposes. These opportunities usually
consist in pooling more patents than what is necessary to achieve procompetitive
effects. This is the case when competitors pool substitute patents. For instance, in
March 1998 the FTC challenged a pool created by Summit Technology, Inc and Visx,
Inc, on the grounds that it was anticompetitive. The pool contained patents related to
two different types of laser used for laser eye surgery, and removed price competition
between the two products. As the FTC stated: “Instead of competing with each other,
the firms placed their competing patents in a patent pool and share the proceeds each
and every time a Summit or VISX laser is used.” This observation holds a general lesson.
Competition between substitute patents does not raise any multiple marginalization
issue that needs to be fixed by joint price setting. On the contrary, in this case, separate
price setting would ensure that price competition works to the benefit of consumers.
The argument that cooperation reduces transaction costs is not relevant here, since
customers only need to license one patent when patents are substitutes. To prevent
anticompetitive effects, patent pools must therefore exclude substitute patents and
include only complementary patents.
However, patent pools can also be anticompetitive even when they contain only
complementary patents. They can be used to force licensees to buy a license on patents
that they do not really need. This happens when some patents included in the package
are complementary but not absolutely necessary for using the standard. Adding these
kinds of patents to the pool can be a way to foreclose competition among substitute
patents that could be used indifferently as complements to the essential patents, by
picking one of them and putting it into the pool.
Preventing these forms of collusion requires severe screening of the patents that will be
included in a pool. Antitrust authorities have therefore forged the concept of patent
“essentiality” to determine which patents should be authorized in a pool. Essential
patents are complementary patents that are necessary to the standard, have no
substitute, and are legally valid. However, this definition is hard to put into practice.
Knowing the exact scope and validity of a patent requires an in-depth assessment by
experts. Moreover, the essentiality of patents may evolve over time, since standards are
regularly updated as the technology is upgraded. From that perspective, the licensing
rules applied by patent pools can be useful for screening essential and non-essential
patents. Patent pools must comply with a set of licensing guidelines aiming at
preventing discrimination and other abuses (see the box below). Among these rules, the
requirement that members of a pool be allowed to license their essential patents
separately from the pool works as an effective safeguard (Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Lerner
et al, 2005). The safeguard relies on the incentives for patent owners and licensees to
circumvent the patent pool when the package license contains more than what users
actually need. When that is the case, licensees would prefer to buy a smaller package at a
slightly lower price. Supplying a reduced package outside the pool would also be
profitable for the patent owners concerned. The threat of seeing the licensees escape can
thus work as corrective mechanism for the patent pool; it prevents it from attempting to
add non-essential patents to its package licence.
Licensing rules in the MPEG-2 and DVD agreement
In 1997 the U.S. Department of Justice issued the first of a series of business letters in
response to a request by MPEG LA regarding the creation of a patent pool for the
MPEG-2 standard. In 1998 and 1999 the Antitrust Division issued similar letters
relating to the patent pool for the Digital Versatile Disc technology standard. Both pools
have implemented the principles set forth in the letters, and are now considered as
templates for the creation of other pools.  
The principles applied by the MPEG-2 and DVD patent pools can be summarized as
follows (Gilbert, 2004):
1. Limitation of the portfolio to technically essential patents which, by definition, are
not competing with each other.
2. Portfolio patents are clearly identified and can be licensed individually as well as in a
package.
3. Issue of worldwide non-exclusive licenses.
4. Licensee liability for royalty conditioned on actual use of the patents.
5. Freedom of licensees to develop and use alternative technologies.
6. When licensees have patents that are essential to comply with the technology,
requirement that they grant back non-exclusive and non-discriminatory licenses on these
patents.
The first principle requires that only essential patents be included in patent pools, and
the second one provides for the independent licensing mechanism that upholds this
principle. The next three principles (3-5) are meant to prevent the pool from imposing
discriminatory or restrictive licensing clauses on its licensees. The last principle aims at
preserving open access to the standard as the underlying technology evolves over time,
by preventing patent owners outside the pool from trying to hijack the standard. The
guidelines issued by the European Commission on technology transfer agreements
contain similar principles.
I.3 – PATENT POOL FORMATION CAN FAIL
Like cartels, patent pools are unstable because members have incentives to deviate from
the collective agreement. Deviations, however, take different forms in cartels and patent
pools. Once a cartel is in place, its members may be tempted to increase their
production or to reduce their price unilaterally, thereby free riding on the self-
restrictions imposed by the other members of the cartel. Things do not work this way in
an authorized patent pool for, unlike illegal cartels, patent pooling agreements are
enforced by legally binding contracts. Still, some patent owners may prefer not to
participate in the patent pool so as to take advantage of the collective self-discipline
accepted by those who did join the pool. This hold out problem arises basically because
an essential patent owner can always charge a higher price if it manages to set its price
after the others (U.S. DoJ & FTC, 2007).
Why is it so? The incentives to free ride by holding out one’s patents are connected to
the multiple marginalization problem which patent pools are supposed to fix. Multiple
marginalization occurs when patent owners set their individual royalties separately.
Each charges a high royalty in order to maximize their individual profit. By doing so,
they fail to take into account the fact that this high royalty will also reduce demand for
licenses on other essential patents. Each patent holder is thus harmed by high royalties
charged by the other patent owners. Hence all the patent owners are better off if they
manage to jointly reduce their royalties. However, it is even more profitable for a single
patent owner to let the others jointly reduce their royalties, while continuing to charge
high royalties for its own patents. A game theory analysis (Aoki & Nagaoka, 2004;
Brenner, 2005) shows that, for this reason, no grand coalition of all patent owners forms
when there is a large number of essential patents. Some patent owners prefer to stay out
of the pool and derive the maximum benefit from the existence of a smaller pool. The W-
CDMA telecommunication standard is an extreme example of this problem. A 3G
platform covering 5 standards (W-CDMA, EDGE, CDMA2000, TD-CDMA and
DECT) was approved by U.S., European and Japanese antitrust authorities in 2002. In
2004 a joint licensing scheme was established with a cap of 5% for the collective royalty
rate. Yet only 7 of the 73 firms claiming essential patents on W-CDMA committed to
the collective license (Bekkers & West, 2006). They include only one of ten largest
essential patent owners. Qualcomm, which holds about one-third of the essential
patents (Goodman & Myers, 2005), did not join the pool, nor did Motorola, Ericsson or
Nokia, the next largest essential patent holders.
Failing to agree on the way collective royalties will be split is an additional reason why
the creation of patent pools can fail. On the one hand, essential patents may cover very
different technologies, some of which are breakthroughs while others are mere
improvements of prior art. They may have involved very different R&D costs for their
owners. For these reasons patent owners may have their own expectations of the
amount of royalty that should be due to their patents. On the other hand, each essential
patent is necessary to use the standard, so that users would be willing to pay a high
price even for a minor patent provided this grants them access to the standard. Reaching
a consensus on how to split collective royalties can therefore be extremely difficult. In
practice, patent pools often allocate royalties based on the number of patents owned by
each member. This formula is applied by the MPEG-2 and 3G patent pools. It has the
merit of simplicity and clarity, and it is acceptable when valuable patents are uniformly
distributed among patent owners. It is, however, hard to accept for a member that owns
a small number of highly valuable patents, and can in that case lead to a failure of the
pool. The split of the DVD pool is a good illustration. The DVD pool was created in
1995 by 10 patent owners. However, Thomson eventually decided to quit the pool and
license its patents separately. It was followed by Philips, Sony and Pioneer, which
created a separate pool (hereafter, 3C). Both pools have since included new members
and widely license their technology. The split was caused by a disagreement over how
the royalty revenue was to be shared. The initial pool divided the royalties based on the
number of patents, which was not acceptable for the members of the 3C pool. The 3C
members hold an estimated 42% of the total patents, whereas the royalty share of the
3C pool is 56% (Aoki & Nagaoka, 2004). This suggests that the members of the 3C
pool viewed their patents as more valuable than the average patent in the initial 10-firm
pool.
II – Standard development and hold-up
Innovators have an interest in their patents being chosen by standards developers. The
widespread adoption of their patents means that they will receive royalties from a large
number of license holders. Competition between technology firms in standard-setting
bodies can therefore be fierce as each firm seeks to prove the superiority of its
innovation and thus influence the choice of standard in favor of its own patent portfolio.
Alongside this above-board rivalry is the danger of anticompetitive behavior. For
example, a firm can deliberately hide the fact that it owns an essential patent until the
standard has been set and adopted. Given the amounts invested by users of the
technology standard by that time, the patent owner can force them to pay much higher
royalties.
This type of ambush was condemned in the Rambus case in the United States in August
2006. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that by hiding its patents, the
California-based firm was in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In December
2005, the European Commission approved a rewording of the rules of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) designed to safeguard against such
attempts at concealment more effectively. In the related press release, the Commissioner
for Competition, Nellie Kroes, said: “Standards are of increasing importance,
particularly in hi-tech sectors of the economy. It is crucial that standard-setting bodies
establish rules which ensure fair, transparent procedures, and early disclosure of relevant
intellectual property”1. On both sides of the Atlantic, Qualcomm, a firm that owns
many patents surrounding mobile telephony standards, is under fire from manufacturers
of electronic components and terminals such as Broadcom, Nokia and Ericsson. The
manufacturers accuse Qualcomm of not honoring its undertaking to license its patents on
reasonable, non-discriminatory terms. How are these rules and behaviors analyzed from
an economic viewpoint?
Patent ambush: the Rambus case and ETSI’s rules
Rambus is a developer of electronic components, headquartered in California. The firm
participated in the work to standardize random access memory (RAM) at JEDEC, the
industry standard-setting body. Rambus took advantage of its involvement to word the
claims of its patents in order to make sure that the new standard would infringe them, all
the while leading the other members to believe that it had no patent covering the future
standard. Rambus then sued the users of the standards for violating its IPR. The FTC
held (in the matter of Rambus inc., Docket No. 9302, opinion of the Commission,
August 2, 2006) that Rambus’s acts of deception constituted exclusionary conduct, in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The FTC also accused Rambus of
monopolizing the market in the technologies incorporated into the JEDEC standards, in
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
ETSI’s rules are regularly reviewed by the European Commission. In the early 1990s
ETSI adopted a policy on intellectual property that rendered patent ambush practically
impossible. It imposed a kind of compulsory license on its members. Patents were
automatically included in standards, unless their owners declared otherwise within six
months. Furthermore, the owners of IPRs were required to notify the ETSI Director
General of the maximum royalty they intended to charge. These default license
                                    
1 Press Release, EC, IP/05/1565, 12 December 2005.
obligations and ex ante licensing were withdrawn in 1994 after a complaint was filed by
some members with the European Commission for infringement of antitrust law2.
Now, in terms of disclosure, ETSI members are required to use their reasonable
endeavors to timely inform ETSI of essential patents, particularly when submitting a
technical proposal for a standard or technical specifications. Members submitting a
technical proposal must, on a bona fide basis, draw the attention of ETSI to any of their
IPRs which might be essential if the proposal is adopted (see ETSI Guide on Intellectual
Property Rights, version endorsed by General Assembly on November 22, 2006).
II.1 – APPLYING THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF HOLD UP TO PATENTS
Hold up theory is derived from economic research on the firm. Imagine a prime
manufacturer that encourages one of its suppliers to buy a machine that can produce
only parts that the prime manufacturer needs. The machine has a purchase value of, say,
1000, and a resale value of only 10 (e.g., in the absence of the prime manufacturer’s
special request, the machine has only scrap value). Once it has invested in the machine,
the supplier is captive and at the mercy of the buyer’s opportunism. For example, the
buyer can push the price at which it buys the parts down to the variable cost and thus
prevent the seller from recouping its investment. The seller’s only option is either to
keep operating the machine for its customer or send it to the scrap heap. In both cases,
it loses 990. O. Williamson (1985) attributes the vertical integration of firms to this risk
of hold up. Opportunism is lower when transactions are conducted between two
subsidiaries than between a buyer and a seller in the market.
Apart from the specifics of investment and opportunism, hold up can only occur when
contracts are incomplete. Indeed, if the supplier is given a long-term contractual
guarantee against a price cut by the buyer, it can invest in a dedicated machine without
risk. Unfortunately, not every random variable can be foreseen in long-term contracts
and some clauses can be interpreted differently by the two parties and by the judges.
The renegotiation of contracts opens the gate to opportunistic behavior, and the risk of
hold up is never zero; it can only be minimized.
This theoretical framework was applied to intellectual property by C. Shapiro (2001).
Imagine that technology A has a value of 100 for its users and that the next-best
technology in terms of quality has a value of 80. If neither of the two technologies is
patented, users will choose technology A and invest in it. For argument’s sake, they
need to spend 50 to make the specific complementary equipment to use the technology.
Then imagine that, after users have made that investment, the owner of technology A
leaps out of the woods and reveals that it holds a patent. The alternative facing users is
either to buy the license requested by the owner of the submarine patent, or to switch to
technology B. The latter option will cost them 50 + 20, i.e., the cost of the
complementary equipment specific to technology B, plus the difference in performance
attributable to the use of this technology. The owner of technology A can therefore
demand a maximum royalty of 70.
Naturally, if users had anticipated the risk of hold up, they would not have invested in
the equipment specific to technology A. Instead they would have opted for technology
B, which offers inferior performance but is known to be unpatented. Hold up is
                                    
2 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning ETSI interim
IPR policy, Official Journal, March 28, 1995, C 076.
therefore not simply a matter of transfer at the expense of licensees; it also induces a
loss of efficiency for society since users do not invest in the highest-performance
technologies. It should also be noted that the amount of the royalty in a hold up
situation is not a reward for innovation, which is the purpose of patent law. If the
owner of technology A had declared itself from the outset, it could have asked a royalty
of 20 at the most, i.e. the total benefit of its invention for users. In other words, hold up
gives a patent holder greater ex post market power than the ex ante market power it
gained from its patent. The difference is ascribable to the owner’s opportunistic action
and to the users’ unrecoverable investment, not to the value of the innovation.
In the area of technology standards, the losses generated by hold up can be extremely
high. The amounts firms waste on complementary equipment – and on the knowledge
and experience required to adapt to a new standard – can be massive. The mobile
telephony standards incorporated in networks and terminals give an idea of scale.
The costs of withdrawing from a technology standard are further increased by the loss
of compatibility, which is the very reason for having a standard. A firm that abandons
the standard unilaterally and uses an alternative technology loses the possibility of
aligning its product on others, which reduces that product’s attractiveness to consumers.
An illustration from mobile telephony would be a situation where the customers of each
operator could only call and be called by subscribers to the same operator. The benefit
of compatibility can only be preserved if users opt simultaneously for the other
technology. In practice, this implies starting a new standardization process, which is
inevitably long and costly. In the case of technology standards, patent hold up can
create a considerable additional market power gain.
II.2 – RULES ON DISCLOSURE OF PATENTS
The requirement on firms that are competing to have their technology chosen for a
standard to disclose their patents is an obvious necessary rule to avoid hold up.
However, enforcing this requirement is not easy. Firms – or at least their representatives
in the working groups of standards developers – do not have accurate knowledge of their
patent portfolios. A portfolio often contains thousands of patents, each of which
consists of at least ten claims whose interpretation can be complex. The search cost
involved in identifying the patents that cover the technologies in the standard is not
negligible. Furthermore, the content of the standard being developed evolves in line with
the discussions. A patent search can turn out to be pointless if the patented technology
is not chosen. In principle, disclosure must also include pending applications for
patents. But the claims that will be accepted are not always known in advance; it is
therefore difficult to know whether a patent will be licensed for the use of the standard.
In practice, standard-setting bodies ask their members to disclose their patents without
requiring them to conduct a search. ETSI is a good example of this. It requires its
members to act in good faith when disclosing their patents (see Inset: Patent ambush:
the Rambus case and ETSI’s rules) but expressly indicates in Article 4.2 of its IPR
Policy that this rule does “not imply any obligation on members to conduct IPR
searches”. Moreover, ETSI does not provide for any precise, specific penalty for firms
that do not comply with the disclosure rules. As for any other violation of its IPR
Policy, it only provides for the General Assembly to take action against infringers. A
simple sanction would be to force members that fail to disclose their patents to license
their technology with no royalty. This kind of rule is applied by VITA (see Inset:
VITA, an avant-garde policy against patent hold up?).
VITA, an avant-garde policy against patent hold up? 
VITA is an incorporated non-profit organization that promotes architectures based on
the VMEbus computer technology. Through its standard-setting committee, it is one of
the smallest organizations in the powerful American National Standards Institute. It was
recently granted approval from the U.S. Department of Justice for its new patent
licensing policy3. The policy is innovative in several ways.
First, the participants in VITA’s standard-setting work are required to state the
maximum royalty they will charge for their patents. Naturally, this ex ante commitment
is underpinned by an obligation to disclose essential patents that could be incorporated
in technology standards under consideration. Participants have precise timeframes for
disclosing their patents and must have conducted a reasonable search in good faith to
identify them. Unsurprisingly, it is expressly stated that no negotiation about the terms
of the licenses can take place during the working group meetings. This is to prevent the
participants from using the forum offered by the standards-setting committee for
anticompetitive purposes.
Second, VITA members must declare in advance any restrictive terms in their licenses.
In particular, these include any obligations on licensees in terms of reciprocal licensing.
With respect to the undertaking on royalties, the license terms are irrevocable. More
accurately, the patent owner can only subsequently lower its royalties or loosen its
conditions.
Third, VITA’s policy provides for a system of penalties. In the event of non-disclosure
of essential patents involved in standards or failure to comply with the undertaking on
the license terms, the participants are obliged to license their technology for no royalty
and with no restrictions on use. These penalties are handed down by the Executive
Director of VITA and then by the appeals board on the basis of a recommendation by
an arbitration tribunal.
Most standards developers ask their members to undertake to apply RAND conditions
to their intellectual property licenses (an F for Fair is often prefixed to the acronym,
especially in Europe). What is the significance of this undertaking? How can “reasonable
and non-discriminatory licensing” be interpreted from an economic standpoint?
There are two opposing legal views of the purpose of RAND licensing. D. Géradin
(2006) considers that the rationale of RAND terms is to prevent refusals to license that
would block the use of a standard. By signing a RAND undertaking, the owner of the
essential patent agrees to enter into good faith negotiation with any license applicant. G.
Ohana et alii (2003) and M. Lemley (2007) contend that RAND terms are a solution to
the problem of hold up. Patent owners thus agree not to put a gun to the heads of the
standard users to extort some of the value of their sunk investments.
II.3 – WHAT IS A REASONABLE ROYALTY?
                                    
3 DoJ Business Review Letter, October 2006, available on
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.htm
Economists share the second view. They propose (see, in particular, Swanson and
Baumol, 2005, C . Shapiro, 2006 and J. Farrell et alii, 2007) a precise definition of a
reasonable royalty, which can be summarized by the following equation:
R= c +(V1-V2)p
The variable c is the incremental cost of licensing. It represents the licensing costs
incurred by the patent owner for negotiation, royalty collection and any related services
(e.g., training for the licensee). (V1 – V2) measures the gain for users of choosing the best
technology over the second-best. The variable p represents the probability that the
patent is valid.
The formula can be applied first to show that “reasonable” does not mean “free”. If the
patents cover two technologies that are perfect substitutes, then V1=V2 and therefore
R=c. If the users of the standard offer less c to the owners, the latter will choose not
license their technologies because they would lose money.
For the sake of the example, now imagine that c is negligible and that the patent on the
best technology is valid. The maximum amount of a reasonable royalty is therefore equal
to the difference in the value of the technologies for users, V1-V2. Users will only be
willing to adopt the best technology if the amount of the royalty does not exceed the
gain it offers over the alternative, second-best technology. This royalty amount enables
the owner of the superior technology to reap the entire gain of its innovation for users.
This is the role of patents as an incentive to innovate: the temporary monopoly enables
the owner to extract most of the wealth generated by its invention for society. In other
words, a reasonable royalty amounts precisely to the market power authorized by the
patent. This point is essential because it means that RAND licensing does not block or
erode the exercise of IPRs. Factoring in the probability of patent validity confirms that
conclusion. Standards can contain uncertain patents, but this risk should be taken into
account in the royalty amount. The economically optimal price of a license falls when
the patent might infringe another patent, or when it does not fully meet the criteria of
being new, non-obvious and useful. This rule applies to patents incorporated into
standards as much as to any other patents.
A reasonable royalty can be conceptualized as the price determined by an auction
mechanism before the standard is set. In other words, it is a competition between all the
technologies that can be selected in which each patent owner states the royalty it
intends to ask if its technology is chosen. This equivalence prompted Swanson and
Baumol (2005) to recommend that standards developers introduce this mechanism,
called ex ante licensing. However, various obstacles make this solution to hold up
impracticable. First, an auction mechanism becomes highly complex when the
technological elements of the standard are interdependent, i.e., when the value of a
technology in terms of performing a function of the standard depends on the technology
chosen to perform another function of the standard. Second, especially when the number
of participants is limited, auctions can be manipulated and lead to collusion prices.
Lastly, this mechanism involves assessing a large number of patents and technologies
that will not be used in the end. While the standard is in the development phase, its
technical content is still fluctuating and uncertain. Organizing a price competition
between potential components of the standard initially considered but subsequently
abandoned generates unnecessary costs.
In light of the above, an ex ante licensing model in which patent owners agree in advance
to ask a reasonable royalty but only set its exact amount once the standard has been
chosen seems less costly. However, it is not as effective at containing the risk of hold
up. When a patent owner undertakes to license on RAND terms, the amount it has in
mind might be quite different from the amount expected by users. In the absence of a
precise figure, these diverging expectations remain hidden. Consequently, if users
underestimate the value of a license, they might then wrongly claim hold up; conversely,
a patent owner can conceal a hold up attempt behind a supposedly bona fide
overvaluation. The imprecision of the R in RAND leaves the gate open to disputes that
are difficult to judge. It is easier for a judge to rule on a licensing contract that specifies a
price than on one that refers only to a “reasonable” royalty.
The antitrust authorities are sometimes called to decide whether a royalty is
“reasonable”. For example, when applying remedies to an abuse of a dominant position
by refusing to license, they must either set an access price or approve the access price
proposed by the parties. The reasonableness of royalties is still a point in dispute
between the European Commission and Microsoft (see Press Release, EC, IP/07/269,
March 1, 2007). Another example is antitrust complaints for failure to license on RAND
terms. In the USA, Broadcom, a manufacturer of chips for mobile telephones, filed a
complaint against Qualcomm, which makes the same type of component and also owns
upstream patents surrounding the second-generation (CDMA) and third-generation
(WCDMA) technology standards. Broadcom accuses Qualcomm of refusing to license
these patents to it on FRAND terms. Broadcom was non-suited in September 20064. In
Europe, Broadcom and five other firms, including Nokia, filed a complaint with the
European Commission against Qualcomm for abuse of a dominant position, particularly
by refusing to license its essential patents on FRAND terms5.
V NON-DISCRIMINATORY LICENSING
The economic interpretation of reasonable royalties, based on the idea of ex ante
competition outlined above, is acceptable to lawyers because it closes a loophole.
Meanwhile, the economic interpretation of non-discriminatory royalties is developing in
a field better charted by the law. Here economists have to align themselves on the legal
interpretation of non-discrimination.
Non-discrimination in access to an essential input is a cornerstone of sector regulation
law. In the case of a rail network, a telephone local loop or an airport hub, a non-
discriminatory access price is one that does not distort competition between users of the
monopoly infrastructure, in particular between new entrants and the vertically
integrated incumbent operator. Users are allowed to win advantages over their rivals
through merit, not because they have had easier access to the network. Non-
discriminatory licensing is thus linked to the concept of a level-playing field.
The economic interpretation of access price discrimination is related to the idea of
setting different prices according to the characteristics of demand. For example, a well-
known economic rule, the Ramsey rule, involves setting a higher price for users of the
                                    
4 See ruling on: http://www.qualcomm.com/press/PDF/broadcom_opinion.pdf and the
case is now pending appeal.
5 S e e  B r o a d c o m ’ s  p r e s s  r e l e a s e s
ht tp: / /www.broadcom.com/press/ re lease .php?id=774809 and Qualcomm’s
http://www.qualcomm.com/press/releases/2005/051028_eucom_response.html.
infrastructure with the lowest price elasticity of demand. From an economic viewpoint,
discrimination is not always counter to the interest of consumers and society. It can be
an efficient way to recoup investment costs and encourage agents to invest. In the case
of intellectual property, royalty discrimination, as opposed to a single fee, gives the
inventor a greater share of the value of its invention for users. This prospect enables a
larger number of inventions to be produced (Lévêque and Ménière, 2003). From an
economic viewpoint, the obligation of non-discrimination can harm consumers. But that
is not how the ND in RAND should be understood.
Rather, economists need to adopt the legal definition of non-discrimination: the licensing
of patents reading on the standard must not distort competition between users. To use a
more up to date expression, the IPR owners agree, if they are or become vertically
integrated, not to foreclose the markets in goods using the standard through their
licensing contracts.
This interpretation is similar to that developed by Swanson and Baumol (2005), who
see the possibility of foreclosure by a vertically integrated firm as the main justification
for the ban on discrimination in the RAND undertaking. They also propose making this
definition operational by applying a specific pricing principle, the Efficient Component
Pricing Rule (ECPR).
The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
The ECPR originated with the deregulation of network industries. It links the access
price to monopoly infrastructure (e.g., railway line, local loop) to the end price of the
services that use it (e.g., train tickets, telephone calls). The ECPR thus sets an access
price that is equal to the operator’s end price minus the incremental cost of all the
inputs other than the access consumed by the operator. This amounts to allowing the
integrated operator to price access at the operating cost plus the opportunity cost, i.e.
the financial loss from losing customers to the new entrant. It is therefore neutral on the
profit of the owner of the infrastructure to provide access and not to supply the
downstream services or not to offer access and to remain the exclusive supplier of those
services. New entrants must be at least as efficient as the incumbent operator. At that
price, only firms whose costs are lower than those of the downstream subsidiary of the
incumbent operator can make a profit. This pricing rule is often criticized for not
reducing the monopoly rent of the incumbent operator. Its defenders respond that the
ECPR seeks to set a price that is neither too low, which would encourage the entry of
inefficient firms, nor too high, which would lead to unnecessary duplication of the
infrastructure. The rule ensures that the downstream market is competitive. Its purpose
is not to end undue market power.
However, because this pricing rule is neutral on the profit of the owner of the input, it
does not solve the problem of hold up. The owner of an integrated patent that sets a
royalty above c + (V1 – V2)p will pass the ECPR test as long as its end price is equal to
the amount of the royalty plus the incremental cost of the other inputs needed to make
the downstream product. Conversely, if the owner of the integrated patent subsidizes
its downstream activity by charging a lower royalty to its downstream subsidiary than
to its more efficient competitors, it will fail the ECPR. The application of the ECPR
aims to avoid the monopoly on the license market being leveraged to downstream
markets. Swanson and Baumol [2005 p.17] stress this exclusive purpose: “The fact that
ECPR alone does not eliminate monopoly profit or monopoly power is no more to its
discredit than the fact that it does not help to cure cancer or baldness or solve any other
problems it was not designed to remedy.”.
Still, using the ECPR to identify an exclusionary practice by the owner of the integrated
patent is a rather peculiar way to demonstrate violation of Article 82 or Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, namely eliminating an equally efficient competitor. Apart from being
difficult to apply, the ECPR test overlooks some behaviors that harm competition and
consumers (F. Lévêque F., 2007). In practice, it has never been used by the US courts
nor, apparently, by the European antitrust authorities. There does not seem to be any
valid reason for choosing this test over another (e.g., the no economic sense test or the
consumer harm test) to establish whether a patent owner has fulfilled its non-
discriminatory licensing undertaking. The only specific feature of leveraging a dominant
position protected by an IPR is that the incentives are stronger than for other
monopolies. That is because a patent offers only a temporary monopoly. Its validity is
limited in time by the legal limit of protection. Often patents do not even last that long
because competitors can conduct research just outside the scope of the patent and
develop a substitute technology. This is even more likely when the patent and its claims
are narrow.
Observe finally that the R and the ND in RAND are highly complementary. When
properly enforced, the reasonable royalty requirement eliminates the market power
linked to hold up, while leaving intact the market power linked to the temporary
monopoly of intellectual property. Meanwhile, the non-discrimination obligation
prevents that market power from being leveraged to downstream markets.
In conclusion, the increasing number of patents in technology standards is raising new
problems. The focus should be shifted away from collusive practices. On the contrary,
to remedy the problem of multiple marginalization, the coordination of patent owners
should even be encouraged. Standards developers must endeavor to contain attempts at
hold up and exclusionary practices on downstream markets. The obligation of RAND
licensing they require of their members contributes to this. The antitrust authorities
must also intervene when patent owners breach that undertaking not to extract a
monopoly rent beyond that derived from the intellectual property and not to use it to
obtain a monopoly on a downstream market.
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